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discrimination foster each other in the United States .... 144
Each of the above quoted factors would be eliminated through suits
brought against that particular discrimination without school desegrega-
tion cases attempting to bear an unbearable load: the long-range elimina-
tion of virtually every form of racial discrimination.
The victims of segregation will neither understand nor accept the
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. Although the state
action limitation must be maintained if the language of the fourteenth
amendment is to have any meaning, the segregation which remains
throughout the United States is evidence of the fact that previous treat-
ment of segregation has been less than effective. Indeed, as discrimina-
tory school policies of the past become more and more distant without
corresponding reductions in school segregation, it becomes obvious that
in providing for greater school desegregation, the courts are treating a
symptom rather than its disease. Where school policies are neutral, but
school segregation remains through segregated residential patterns, the
courts should seek a vehicle which promises to relieve those residential
patterns. As school segregation increasingly reflects residential patterns
formed by housing and employment discrimination rather than school
discrimination, means must be sought to relieve the inequality in housing
and employment. In short, Brown I and the resultant school desegrega-
tion cases have done much to eliminate assignment on the basis of race,
one of the causes of racial imbalance in schools. Other, more direct
vehicles should be sought to eliminate the other causes.
RICHARD L. HARDEN
JOHN M. MASON
ATTORNEY FEES IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
CASES
In Bradley v. School Board (Fees)' the City of Richmond School
Board was ordered to pay in excess of $43,000 for the attorney fees of
opposing counsel in the ten-month school desegregation case Bradley v.
School Board (Consolidation).2 The amount allotted for attorney fees
should not have been too surprising; desegregation litigation is particu-
larly expensive due to its protracted nature as well as its need for specially
"'Bradley v. School Bd. (Consolidation), No. 3353 at 253 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 1972).
153 FR.D. 28 (E.D. Va. 1971).
2No. 3353 (E.D. Va., Jan. 5, 1972).
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qualified attorneys.3 The allowance itself, however, was somewhat un-
usual, in that attorney fees, absent a statute or contractual agreement to
the contrary, are normally borne by the individual litigants.4 Because the
onus of attorney fees may well have a bearing on the amount of such non-
fee-generating litigation, and thus the speed with which school desegrega-
tion is accomplished, the topic of attorney fees in desegregation cases
deserves attention.
School desegregation cases were non-existent prior to Brown v. Board
of Education (Brown I), s wherein the Supreme Court found unconstitu-
tional the separate but equal doctrine6 as applied to public education. In
so ruling the Court realized that the problems surrounding the desegrega-
tion of entire school systems would be of "considerable complexity;"' 7 it
therefore postponed consideration of a remedy until such time as there
could be a full hearing on possible forms of relief. In Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown 11)8 the Court proposed its solution: "School authori-
ties have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving
these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school
authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing consti-
tutional principles."9 The Court thus anticipated litigation and relied
upon the equitable powers of the district courts to shape judgments in a
manner consistent with both the administrative needs of individual school
systems and the constitutional rights of all children to a desegregated
education.' As a proposition of common law, however, these judgments
would not include a taxing of attorney fees upon the loser as costs,
inasmuch as American courts are not normally competent to provide such
relief in law or equity."
3The need for specially qualified attorneys is not only a factor of the specialization
required but is also related to the reluctance of many attorneys to handle such litigation.
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963); Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241, 244-
45 (5th Cir. 1968).
1Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-19 (1967):
Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 197 (1878): Philp v. Nock, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 460
(1873); Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450,452-53 (1872); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 211, 230-31 (1872); Teese v. Huntingdon, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 2, 8-9 (1859): Day
v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 370-72 (1851); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3
DalI.) 306 (1796).
5347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'This doctrine was originally upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
'Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
8349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Vd. at 299.
l"Id. at 300.
"Cases cited note 4 supra. See generally Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929)
(hereinafter Goodhart). The American theory has been the subject of extensive criticism.
See Avilla, Shall Counsel Fees be Allowed?, 13 J. ST. B. CALIF. 42 (1938); Ehrenzweig,
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The rationale behind this rule is clear. An important objective of
American jurisprudence is unhindered access to the courts. It is argued
that the taxing of attorney fees as costs upon the loser would discourage
litigation, inasmuch as those of moderate means would be unwilling or
unable to afford the risk of losing. 2 Even if a party remained willing to
litigate, a determination of attorney fees by the courts would be time-
consuming and expensive; 3 moreover, victorious attorneys might well
feel justified in padding their expenses in anticipation of the fact that their
client would not bear the expense. Indeed, the very fact that the amount
of attorney fees would be evaluated by a judge seemingly intrudes upon
*a theory of justice which prides itself on its respect for written law rather
than the unfettered discretion of individuals. 4 And finally, earlier think-
ing on the possibility of awarding attorney fees as a part of costs was
probably influenced by colonial individualism which looked upon the laW
as an understandable body of rules not requiring an attorney's expertise."
It can, of course, be argued that the use of attorney fee awards would
prod out-of-court desegregation, 6 and thus further the ultimate goal of
Brown L This contention, however, disregards the assumption of the
Supreme Court that reasonable minds will differ as to a school board's
method and timing of desegregation,' 7 as well as ignores the proscription
of Brown 11 that the courts be used to test the constitutionality of desegre-
gation plans." It is thus the implicit assumption in a school desegregation
case, or any case for that matter, that no legal interest in the abstract is
any more important than any other legal interest, and that there is at least
some doubt as to which legal interest will ultimately prevail. American
Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792 (1966);
Ehrenzweig, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 26 J. ST. B. CALIF. 107 (1951); Kuenzel, The
Attorney's Fee: Why Not A Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REv. 75 (1963); Stirling,
Attorney's Fees: Who should Bear the Burden?, 41 J. ST. B. CALIF. 874 (1966); Stoebuck,
Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 202 (1966).
2See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967);
cf Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 (1964); id. at 236-39 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
13Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872); Monolith Portland Midwest
Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288, 298 (9th Cir. 1969).
"See Goodhart at 877.
"5For a critical view of this historical attachment to each litigant paying his own
attorney fees see Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966).
'6Text accompanying notes 64-67 infra.
"7The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), noted a number
of different variables which might affect the manner in which a school board would want
to approach desegregation. Id. at 295. Because of these variables the Court felt compelled
to provide for a flexible standard in evaluating constitutionality.
18Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
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courts make this assumption in the absence of a statute or contractual
provision to the contrary.'9
In contrast, the enactment of a statute allowing the taxation of attor-
ney fees as costs rebuts the presumption that all interests litigated are
legally indistinguishable. Often Congress will declare that the vindication
of certain legal interests supersedes the policy considerations supporting
each litigant's bearing his own attorney fees. 0 Congress provided in sec-
tion 2000a-3(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that counsel fees in a
litigation alleging discrimination in public accommodations may be
awarded at the Court's discretion.2 In Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc. 22 the Supreme Court interpreted this section as an expression
of congressional intent to encourage Title II litigation and to punish those
who would assert any legal justification for discriminatory conduct. 2
The initiator of a Title II action was depicted as a "'private attorney
general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority. 12 4 Significantly, the Court rejected the theory that section
2000a-3(b) should be interpreted as a mere attempt to discourage defenses
of no legal merit;" the court noted that an attorney fee award based on
an unmeritorious defense is distinguishable from an attorney fee award
premised on congressional interest in encouraging litigation.
2 6
"See cases cited note 4 supra.
2'See, e.g., Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1970); Perishable Agricul-
tural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) (1970); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970);
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970); Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77www(a) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1970);
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1970); Servicemen's Readjustment Act, 38 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1970); Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C.-§ 206 (1970); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1970).
2142 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970). It should be noted that the statute accomplished this
feat by describing such attorney fees as a part of the "cost" of the litigation. Costs are
traditionally paid by the loser of an action at law or equity, in the court's discretion. Cf. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1920, -21, -23, -27 (1970).
-390 U.S. 400 (1968).
21d. at 402.
24
d.
2542 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970) was previously interpreted in Bell v. Alamatt Motel,
243 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Miss. 1965), to be a non-punitive measure to discourage unmerito-
rious litigation. Id. at 474.
28390 U.S. at 402 n.4. See also Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d
421 (8th Cir. 1970). In Parham the court, faced with a provision similar to § 2000a-
3(b), permitted the award of attorney fees in litigation involving discriminatory hiring
practices. Applicant was found not to have been refused work for racial reasons, although
his bringing the action was construed as a "catalyst" which prompted a more vigorous fair
employment program by the company. Interestingly, the court of appeals permitted appli-
cant to collect attorney fees for the prosecution of his appeal even though it resulted in
neither an injunction nor an award of damages. Since the appeal vindicated no rights, it
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Given the absence of statutory authorization for the award of attorney
fees, the distinction becomes more than a matter of semantics in discuss-
ing their allocation in desegregation cases. The Supreme Court recog-
nized in Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank"7 that courts in equity have
always possessed the authority to award attorney fees when the special
circumstances of a case were such that justice required the relief. Though
"such allowances are appropriate only in exceptional cases and for domi-
nating reasons of justice,"' ' it is an accepted rule that an unmeritorious
defense constitutes such an exceptional case. 2 Thus, while a right in law
to attorney fees must look to the statute creating that right for a guide
as to a fee allocation, an award of attorney fees in equity looks to the
justness of the winner's having to pay his own fees in the litigation in
order to determine if a special assessment should be paid by the loser 0
Since there is no statutory right to court-awarded attorney fees in school
desegregation cases, and because there is a significant difference between
the conditions under which a court may award attorney fees, depending
upon the existence or non-existence of a permitting statute, it is, there-
fore, through the principles of equity alone that attorney fees may be
awarded in school desegregation cases."'
would appear that Parham was reimbursed for having brought the initial action, and the
company was punished for having made such a litigation initially necessary. In addition the
company was punished by having to pay all attorney fees for the appeal even though it
accomplished nothing. This ruling can be interpreted as encouraging appeals even when the
possibility of success is nonexistent.
-307 U.S. 161 (1939).
2Id. at 167.
"See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968);
Undersea Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 429 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.
1970); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
"In Brewer v. School Bd., No. 71-1900 (4th Cir., Mar. 7, 1972) an award of attorney
fees was justified on a somewhat different equitable basis. In Brewer the Norfolk School
Board was- ordered to pay the cost of busing students to achieve racial balance. The court
found that the School Board was not defending the suit in bad faith but nonetheless taxed
the plaintiffs attorney fees to the school board. It was noted that where one litigant
preserves a fund which will be available to others in his class, the fund will reimburse the
successful litigant; in theory, by assessing the costs to the fund all those who benefit from
the litigation pay for its prosecution. Though no common fund was preserved in Brewer,
the fact that each student would receive a "pecuniary benefit" was held to constitute an
exceptional circumstance which approached common fund status. Because it would have
been impractical to collect from all students who benefited from the litigation, the court
taxed the defendant, inasmuch as the school board was in the best position to absorb the
expense. This approach may have some effect on the taxation of attorney fees in busing
cases, but it should not affect most desegregation litigation inasmuch as there is usually no
question of a common fund being created.
3'Contra, Bradley v. School Bd. (Fees), 53 F.R.D. 28, 41 (E.D. Va. 1971). For a
discussion of this opinion see text accompanying notes 67-71 infra.
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The first instance of attorney fees being awarded in a school desegre-
gation case was Bell v. School Board.2 There the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, noting the Richmond School Board's "long continued pattern
of evasion and obstruction" in failing to initiate desegregation plans,
overruled the district court's refusal to grant attorney fees as an abuse of
discretion.3 3 The court relied principally on Rolax v. Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Co. 3 4 in its decision. In Rolax, also a Fourth Circuit
opinion, the attorney fees of an indigent black worker had been taxed
against the union which unjustly discriminated against him. The court,
in approving the taxation, first held that the issues litigated did not pres-
ent a real controversy, inasmuch as the defenses had been refuted by prior
litigation, 35 and further noted the economic disparity between the plain-
tiff and union defendant.3 6 The Rolax case thus presented two factors
justifying the attorney fee award.
Bell, though relying on Rolax, made no note of an economic disparity
between plaintiff and defendant. It thus becomes important to analyze a
second case cited authoritatively in Bell: Vaughan v. Atkinson.3 7 This
Supreme Court case dealt with a suit in admiralty in which attorney fees
were awarded to a seaman who had been forced by his employer's recal-
citrance to bring suit for maintenance and cure. It was the company's
"willful and persistent" default which justified the award;38 however, the
award was granted as a matter of damages at law, rather than relief in
equity.39 Bell's reliance on this decision suggests two possibilities. First,
the court may have been trying to apply the holding of Vaughan and thus
permitting attorney fees to be summarily awarded by the court. This
theory is difficult to support in that the Supreme Court in Vaughan relied
on the tradition of damages in admiralty," whereas in Bell the court of
appeals proceeded exclusively on an equitable theory.4 A more satisfac-
tory interpretation of Vaughan's presence in Bell lies in its utility as an
isolater of a defendant's conduct as the sole premise for an attorney fee
award. Whereas Rolax involved both economic disparity and a defen-
dant's bad faith in forcing a plaintiff to litigate clearly established rights,"
32321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
13d. at 500.
34186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
1Id. at 478.
3 1d. at 481.
-7369 U.S. 527 (1962).
"A8d. at 530-31.
"Id. at 530.
4
0
1d.
41Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963).
42Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951).
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Vaughan involved only the latter.13 Thus, in Bell it was the Richmond
School Board's having made litigation necessary, despite the clear legal
duty to desegregate, that triggered the equitable award of attorney fees.
This justification for an equitable award of attorney fees was eluci-
dated in Bradley v. School Board (Free Choice)." There the Fourth Cir-
cuit refused to increase an equity award of seventy-five dollars for attor-
ney fees, stating: "Attorneys' fees are appropriate only when it is found
that the bringing of the action should have been unnecessary and was
compelled by the school board's unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy."45 In
other words, it is only the school board's malevolent conduct forcing an
individual to litigate clearly established rights that will justify the taxation
of attorney fees.4" Such a litigation, though necessary in the practical
sense that it is required to force school board compliance with constitu-
tional requirements, is in principle unnecessary in that the school board
is fully aware of its constitutional duty prior to the litigation. On the other
hand, a good faith litigation of the constitutional means of desegregation,
even though giving rise to substantial relief, is not a proper basis for the
equitable remedy. 7 A finding of good or bad faith is a discretionary
determination of the trial court.4
The award of attorney fees in school desegregation cases is, therefore,
no more than a court's evaluation of a school board's reasonableness in
litigating the constitutionality of a particular desegregation plan or its
application. 9 The defense of an issue which is no longer open to doubt
43Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
"345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965).
151d. at 321.
"Conduct which forces an unnecessary litigation should be distinguished from vexa-
tious conduct of an attorney in the prosecution of an action. In the latter circumstance the
court may tax unreasonable costs to the guilty attorney. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1970).
17See Bradley v. School Bd. (Free Choice), 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965). The amount of fees is usually a "reasonable" amount.
The dissent in Bradley (Free Choice) suggested that the amount could be evaluated by
looking at the school board's expenses. Id. at 324. The paltry sum of $75 was reasonable
because the Bradley case involved primarily a constitutional check on the "free choice plan"
and only collaterally a specific abuse of the plan. The district court awarded attorney fees
for the unreasonable defense of the specific abuse.
sWhitley v. City Bd. of Educ., No. 71-1843 at 4-5 (4th Cir. Mar. 21, 1972); Brewer v.
School Bd., No. 71-1900 at 14 (4th Cir., Mar. 7, 1972); Cappel v. Adams, 434 F.2d 1278,
1279-80 (5th Cir. 1970); Williams v. Kimbrough, 415 F.2d 874, 875 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970); Bradley v. School Bd. (Free Choice), 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965).
9In Bradley v. School Bd. (Free Choice), 345 F.2d 310 (4th cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965), the court refused to award attorney fees to the extent that
the action constituted a litigation of the constitutionality of the free choice plan, inasmuch
as there was a real dispute. However, the court upheld the district court award of $75 which
1972]
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constitutes an unmeritorious defense and is, therefore, an appropriate
instance for an attorney fee award.5" Each case is evaluated upon its own
merit.51 Significantly, Bell is the only case to date in which a district court
has been overruled in its determination to permit or to disallow the
equitable award. 52 Though on occasion a reviewing court has noted that
the specific circumstances of the case would have justified an award of
attorney fees, such court has also noted that a finding of bad faith was
within the discretion of the trial court and not to be overturned in the
absence of blantant abuse.
53
Thus it appears that the Bell-Bradley standard of unnecessary litiga-
tion, though criticized, 4 is firmly entrenched in the restraint of equity.
represented an assessment upon the school board for litigating a patently unconstitutional
abuse of the plan. Accord, Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966). However,
in some instances the courts will not award attorney fees for a collateral issue. It is unclear
whether this is a factor of the court's unwillingness to find an unnecessary litigation on the
issue or an unwillingness to impose attorney fees for such a small portion of the action.
See Betts v. County School Bd., 269 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Va. 1967); Wright v. County
School Bd., 252 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Va. 1966).
5OSee Whitley v. City Bd. of Educ., No. 71-1843 (4th Cir. Mar. 21, 1972). Nesbit v.
Statesville City Bd. of Educ., 418 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1969); Cato v. Parham, 403 F.2d 12
(8th Cir. 1968); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Hill v. Franklin
County Bd. of Educ., 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968); Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661
(8th Cir. 1966): Griffin v. County School Bd., 363 F.2d 206 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 960 (1966); Bradley v. School Bd. (Free Choice), 345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), vacated on
other grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965); Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir.),
rev'd on other ground sub nom., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Bell v.
School Bd., 32.1 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
5'See Dyer v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Miss. 1969). Dyer was a voter reapportion-
ment suit which dealt collaterally with the issue of attorney fees in equity. The court, after
granting attorney fees, noted "that the allowance of an attorney's fee herein is not to be
considered as a precedent for the allowance of fees in other cases of similar import. Every
case must stand upon its own bottom." Id. at 987.
52It should be noted, however, that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has re-
evaluated the specifics of an award under extenuating circumstances. In Griffin v. County
School Bd., 363 F.2d 206 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960 (1966), the court disallowed
a district court's allocation of taxable costs among defendants on the grounds that such a
determination was for the parties inter se. Id. at 212. The court also refused to adopt the
district court's determination that the failure of plaintiffs to assert their claim in state rather
than federal courts should act to reduce the equitable award.
"Williams v. Kimbrough, 415 F.2d 874, 875 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1061 (1970); Cato v. Parham, 403 F.2d 12, 16 (8th Cir. 1968); Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d
14, 23 (8th Cir. 1965); Bradley v. School Bd. (Free Choice), 345 F.2d 310, 321 (4th Cir.),
vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965). See also Hill v. Franklin County Bd. of
Educ., 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968). In Hill the court of appeals found an attorney fee
award of one thousand dollars "somewhat disproportionate" to a judgment of $286.80, but
not an abuse of discretion.
5 See Felder v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 409 F.2d 1070, 1076 (4th Cir. 1969)
(Sobeloff and Winter, JJ., dissenting); Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661, 670-71 (8th
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Indeed, one court of appeals reasoned with considerable-logic that the
willingness of Congress to provide for attorney fees in certain civil rights
cases should be interpreted as a restraining force on the court's inclination
to relax the standards of equity in other civil rights areas.55 It is, therefore,
asserted that any "movement" to increase the liberality with which attor-
ney fees are awarded in school desegregation cases must come from the
lower court's subjective evaluation of desegregation litigation, rather than
from a change in the actual standard of unnecessary litigation. The puz-
zling aspect of school desegregation litigation in the 1970's is not the strict
requirements of equity but rather the unwillingness of federal courts to
find that those requirements have been met.
The Supreme Court found in 195456 that segregated educational facili-
ties were unconstitutional and in 1955 s1 ordered school boards to desegre-
gate. Until 1963 no school board was found guilty of unreasonable obstin-
acy in using the courts to avoid desegregation;" possibly the meaning of
segregation was so unclear that any remedial relief would have been
unjust. 5 Even today there are problems in determining the lengths to
which a school board must go in providing or insuring an integrated
education for all children." Nonetheless, in situations where a school
board is using litigation to delay, rather than define, the constitutional
duty to desegregate, the justification for awarding attorney fees becomes
increasingly compelling.6 '
Cir. 1966); Bradley v. School Bd. (Free Choice), 345 F.2d 310, 324-25 (4th Cir.), vacated
on other grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (Sobeloff and Bell, JJ., concurring and dissenting in
part).
sKemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14, 23 (8th Cir. 1965). See also Fleischmann Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). But it has also been argued that when
the same circumstances which first moved Congress to enact legislation exist there is a
rationale for using equity to make the attorney fee award even in the absence of a statute.
See Bradley v. School Bd. (Fees), 53 F.R.D. 28, 41-42 (E.D. Va. 1971).
"Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
mBell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
"In theory segregation is easily defined; in practice distinctions may be very subtle.
Though few would argue that some school boards have been less than subtle in their
opposition to integration, it must also be realized that the courts have had difficulty in
pinning down the exact nature of unconstitutional segregation. Under such circumstances
it is difficult to argue that a school board is not entitled to a clarification in the form of an
adjudication. See generally Note, School Desegregation and Affirmative Equitable
Relief- Swann and Beyond, supra this issue.
clCf. Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402
U.S. 43 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 F.2d 430 (1968).
"It has recently been suggested that attorney fees be awarded as a matter of course in
all school desegregation cases in the absence of a showing that such an award would be
unjust. It was reasoned that the duty and means of desegregation have been so well defined
since 1954 that the presumption of a school board's good faith litigation is no longer valid.
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A number of opinions have already expressed a desire to allow attor-
ney fee awards on a more frequent basis. In Bradley (Free Choice)" two
judges of the five-man court were in favor of permitting plaintiff to
recover attorney fees even though the major issue litigated, the constitu-
tionality of the free choice plan, was determined in defendant's favor.
63
The majority allowed seventy-five dollars for the fees of plaintiff in liti-
gating the collateral issue of a specific abuse of the plan. The minority
was unclear as to whether it believed that the seventy-five dollars was too
small an amount, presuming it was proper to grant attorney fees only for
the collateral issue, or whether it suggested that the defendants should
have borne the expense of the complete litigation as a result of having
forced an unnecessary litigation of one issue.64 The punitive tone of the
dissent suggests the latter theory.
The premise upon which a punitive theory of attorney fees has been
grounded is well-expressed in Clark v. Board of Education.5 There, al-
though attorney fees were not allowed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals declared: "The time is coming to an end when recalcitrant state
officials can force unwilling victims of illegal discrimination to bear the
constant and crushing expense of enforcing their constitutionally ac-
corded rights."66 The court was not hesitant to suggest that "the time is
fast approaching when the additional sanction of substantial attorney fees
should be seriously considered by the trial courts. ' 67 It is cautioned,
however, that punishment is not the proper goal of equity inasmuch as
equity is remedial and not punitive.
In a 1971 decision, Bradley (Fees),6" a federal district court again
considered the possibility of applying a punitive theory. The court then
held that equity need not be the only theory under which attorney fees
could be awarded," although the decision was justified on equitable prin-
ciples as well.7" Judge Merhige was "persuaded that in 1970 and 1971 the
character of school desegregation litigation has become such that full and
Thus, unless the school board can affirmatively establish its good faith in litigation, the
court in equity should presume bad faith and grant its equitable relief of attorney fees. See
Brewer v. School Bd., No. 71-1900 at 26-30 (4th Cir., Mar. 7, 1972) (Winter, J., concurring
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appropriate relief must include the award of expenses of litigation."', The
opinion did not provide a satisfactory explanation for this conclusion.
Apparently the court felt that the authority to award damages at law is
independent of the right to award attorney fees in equity, and that the
right to award damages includes the authority to award attorney fees.
2
The logical fallacy of the argument is obvious: Congress has not passed
a statute permitting the court to award attorney fees in school desegrega-
tion cases. In the absence of such a statute the courts are bound by the
general rule that attorney fees are not awarded in actions at law. Any
other decision would imply that the traditional self-restraint expected of
a court sitting in equity may be by-passed by merely calling the relief "full
and appropriate" rather than "equitable".
It thus must be concluded that the future of school desegregation
litigation does not appear to hold out a bright future so far as attorney
fee awards are concerned. Despite the unconscionable use of the courts
to delay desegregation,7 3 federal district courts appear unwilling to
award attorney fees in the absence of federal legislation. This patent
unwillingness to exercise discretion, though reviewable, has been inter-
preted as abusive only once.7 Hopefully as the courts clarify the stan-
dards for desegregation, they will find-the existence of segregated schools
more "exceptional" and thus a "situation" deserving of equitable relief
in the form of an attorney fee award.
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-42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides that discriminators "shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." The
district courts have original jurisdiction in such litigation, "[t]o redress the deprivation,
under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, or any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of
Congress providing for equal rights of citizens .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). Judge
Merhige's opinion never states what statute gives his court the right to award damages.
Hence, the above suggested explanation is at best conjecture.
"See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 448 n.5 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
concurring.)
"Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963).
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